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THE EFFECT OF EXPUNGEMENT ON
REMOVABILITY OF NON-CITIZENS
James A. R. Nafziger*
Michael Yimesgen**
For most of the twentieth century, a non-citizen was generally not subject to re-
moval on the basis of a criminal conviction which had been expunged by the state
that rendered the conviction. During that time, the definition of a "conviction"
for purposes of immigration law was borrowed from the law of the state which
rendered the criminal conviction. In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IRIRA) of 1996 Congress sought to provide a more
uniform definition of the term "conviction" sufficient to justify an order of re-
moval under the immigration law. The IIRIRA does not mention expungement,
however'
This Article argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and courts
have misconstrued the IIRIRA. In 1999 the BIA first dealt with the effect of a
state expungement under the statute. This Article argues that the BIA's decision
in Matter of Roldan improperly reversed more than a half-century of precedent
by refusing to give effect to a state expungement of a non-citizen's conviction
unless expressly provided by federal statute. Judicial decisions have since accepted
this rule.
Part I of this Article reviews state expungement statutes. Part II summarizes cases
prior to the IIdRRA. Part III explains the IIRIRA and Matter of Roldan. Part
IV addresses recent cases concerning the effect of a state expungement on remov-
ability, arguing that these cases have either misconstrued the IIRIRA or
improperly applied the Chevron doctrine. Part V compares the current state of
the law with immigration laws abroad, arguing that the exceptional result
reached by United States courts is further evidence that Matter of Roldan and
its progeny are mistaken.
Since the suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, public anxiety
about terrorism and homeland security has eclipsed some of the
civil liberties of non-citizens. The current focus on specific
anti-terrorist measures, however, should not overshadow other
threats to the liberties of non-citizens. A recurring issue under
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United States immigration law involves the removability' of non-
citizens convicted of a crime whose conviction has been expunged
by state or federal authority. For over fifty years the issue was largely
settled by a presumption that expungement barred such
removability. In 1999, however, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) overturned precedent by interpreting the definition of a
"conviction" under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)2 to void the effect of an
expungement, even though the Act did not expressly address the
consequences of expungement. The new interpretation, set forth in
In re Roldan-Santoyo,3 has affected subsequent administrative and
judicial decisions. In view of the serious consequences of removal for
non-citizens, the new line of decisions merits careful examination.
Legislative and decisional reform may be advisable.
This Article reviews the issue of expungement4 as a basis for can-
cellation of removal on criminal grounds. Part I presents an
overview of state expungement statutes. Part II summarizes BIA
cases before Roldan. Part III discusses the significance of the
IIRIRA, its legislative history, and the BIA's initial interpretation of
it. Part IV critiques the Roldan line ofjudicial decisions, with a par-
ticular focus on a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Ramirez-Castro v. I.N.S.-5 Part V offers several comparative insights,
and Part VI provides a brief conclusion that urges a return to the
pre-1999 practice.
1. Before 1996, immigration law distinguished between deportation of non-citizen
residents in the United States and exclusion of non-citizens from entry (now called admis-
sion) into the United States. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act [hereinafter IIRIRA] combines the two procedures into one "removal" proceeding.
Relief from removal is generally referred to as "cancellation." This article uses both sets of
terms, "deportation" and "deportability" (pre-IIRIRA) and "removal" and "removability"
(post-IIRIRA), depending on the historical circumstances.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A) (1996).
3. In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1999), to be discussed in section III
(b) of the text.
4. The term "expungement," unless otherwise specified, refers to the process by
which valid nolo contendere pleas, findings of guilt or admissions of guilt are later vacated,
reversed, sealed, purged, or destroyed by state expungement or rehabilitative statutes.
5. 287 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2002).
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I. EXPUNGEMENT
The first instances of expungement of criminal records involved
acts of clemency under the English Crown. In the United States,
procedures for erasing or setting aside juvenile offender convic-
tions existed as early as 1950.7 Subsequently, commentators and
professional groups advocated expungement "as an integral part of
[a] correctional philosophy [of rehabilitation]"' and met with suc-
cess when, inspired by the 1956 National Conference on Parole,
state legislatures began to enact expungement laws.9
The goal of expungement legislation has been to facilitate a
convicted person's reentry into society. Specifically, statutes have
had one or more of the following purposes: to eliminate discrimi-
nation against convicts who have fulfilled their sentence terms and
have been deemed rehabilitated, to reduce the potential for con-
tinuing public sanction, and to reward rehabilitated convicts. °
Within its plain meaning," expungement might be expected to
help accomplish these ends by sealing or physically destroying an
offender's record and thereby shielding it from public scrutiny.'
2
6. Michael D. Mayfield, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in the Informa-
tion Age, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 1057, 1073 (1997) (citing Isabel Brawer Stark, Comment,
Expungement and Sealing of Arrest and Conviction Records: The New Jersey Response, 5 SETON
HALL L. REv. 864,865 (1974)).
7. Mark A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and
Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 733, 740 n.27 (1981) (citing the Federal
Youth Corrections Act of 1950 as an example).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 742 (crediting the National Conference on Parole for the concept of adult
expungement in the United States). See also id. at 734 n.3 (illustrating that California's ex-
pungement statute, originally enacted in 1909, is one of the few state statutes that predates
the National Conference on Parole); id. at 741 (finding that the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency also urged the passage of state acts that would "annul a record of convic-
tion for certain purposes" (quoting Annulment of a Conviction of a Crime: A Model Act, 8
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97, 100 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted)); id. at 741 (summa-
rizing the Model Penal Code's Proposed Official Draft of 1962, which allowed the vacation
of convictions if the convict "has fully satisfied the sentence and has since led a law-abiding
life for at least [five] years" (internal quotations omitted)).
10. Id. at 737-38.
11. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 582 (6th ed. 1990) (defining expunge as "[t]o destroy;
blot out; obliterate ... [t]he act of physically destroying information-including criminal
records-in files, computers, or other depositories").
12. Franklin & Johnsen, supra note 7, at 742 (finding that the goal of modern
expungement statutes was to aid rehabilitation by preventing public knowledge of the
offender's record). See also Barry M. Portnoy, Note, Employment of Former Criminals, 55
CORNELL L. REv. 306, 306-11 (1970) (illustrating the economic reasons why expungement
statutes, in the interest of productivity, initially focused on the availability of criminal
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Generally, however, expungement statutes do not actually void a
successful petitioner's criminal record. 3 Instead, they authorize
any of three forms of amelioration: suspension of a sentence con-
ditioned upon completion of probation, 4 deferral of sentencing
with no imposition of sentence upon a showing of good behavior,'
5
or dismissal or vacation of a conviction upon the completion of
probation and the lapse of a statutorily prescribed period of time.
16
So-called hybrid expungement statutes, such as that of Califor-
nia, '7 authorize courts to grant an expungement if a person has
met all the terms of probation, if the court directs an early dis-
charge from probation, or if granting an expungement is
otherwise in the interests of justice. Generally, state expungement
statutes require petitioners to show that they have been rehabili-
tated since their conviction and limit the number of times
expungement is available to an individual petitioner. 1 Relief is
usually unavailable for convictions of serious felonies and sex of-
fenses, especially if the victim is a minor.'9
records, which adversely affected a convicted person's ability to gain employment and fulfill
the terms of parole).
13. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-901 (Michie 1987), amended by 2003 ARK. ADV.
LEGIS. SERv. H.B. 2246 (Michie) (stating that expungement means "sealing" the record and
not physically destroying it and restricting the availability of expungement relief for sexual
offenses against minors); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-308 (West 2002), amended by 2003
COLO. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 43, S.B. 03-109 (West) (describing the process by which a criminal
record is "sealed" rather than physically destroyed). For a general discussion of expunge-
ment statutes, see Peter D. Pettier & Dale Hilmen, Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and
Conviction: Expungementfrom the General Public Access, 3 CAL. W. L. REV. 121 (1967).
14. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.085 (Michie 2002) (giving courts broad discretion to
suspend a sentence and discharge a person from probation upon a showing of good con-
duct); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893 (West 2002).
15. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.3 (West 2002), amended by 2003 IowA LEGIS. SERV. S.F.
422 (West); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893.
16. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.640 (West 2002) (allowing a convicted person
to petition the court to vacate a conviction if all the obligations of sentencing have been
met and the statutory time period has passed); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214619 (2002) (requiring
between three to five years to pass, depending on the crime, and the satisfaction of all the
terms of sentencing or probation before a petition for expungement is considered).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 2002), as interpreted in Ramirez-Castro v. INS, 287
F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002).
18. Mayfield, supra note 6, at 1060 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-910 (Law. Co-op.
2002) as an example of "one-time-only" expungement relief).
19. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-901 (excluding sex offenses from expungement re-
lief); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 18 (West 2002), amended by 2003 OKLA. SESS. LAW SERV.
Ch.3, H.B. 1816 (West) (limiting expungement relief to misdemeanor convictions); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4619 (2002) (denying expungement relief for sexually motivated crimes,
child abuse, murder, and manslaughter).
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Although most states have enacted general or hybrid expunge-
ment statutes,20 Congress has not.2  Consequently, until its decision
in Matter of Roldan,2 the BLA had relied on state expungement
statutes as a source of relief from deportation orders. In other con-
texts, federal courts (and some state courts) have relied on their
inherent powers to order expungements.
II. PRE-IIRIRA DECISIONS OF THE BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
• 24
In re Ringalda, a 1943 U.S. District Court decision, was the first
to extend expungement relief to non-citizens in deportation pro-
ceedings. The same year, in Matter of V, the BIA ruled that an
expunged conviction cannot "serve as the basis for an order of de-
portation. 2 5 Later, in Matter of 0 T,26 the BIA confirmed that "no
change appears to be warranted in the present view of the [immi-
gration] Service" because there is "substantial doubt as to the
propriety of holding that, as far as immigration proceedings are
concerned, the person remains one who has been convicted of a
crime [after a state has granted an expungement]. 27 In consider-
ing a conflict between California Supreme Court decisions that did
not extend the ameliorative effect of the state's expungement stat-
ute2 and federal appeals court decisions that did so, the BIA
20. Some states that qualify the availability of expungement make it available only
when the person is acquitted, a nolle prosequi is entered, or criminal charges are dismissed.
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4372 (2002). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-5-1 (West 2002)
(limiting expungement to arrests with no subsequent charges or to charges dropped be-
cause of mistaken identity or probable cause). See contra Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-307 (Michie
2002) (expressly proscribing courts' authority to expunge convictions).
21. James w. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv., 73, 80 (1992) (observing that "on the federal level Congress has not pro-
vided a generalexpungement statute") (emphasis added).
22. 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1999).
23. See Diehm, supra note 21, at 81. See also United States v. Smith, 940 E2d 395 (9th
Cir. 1991) (overturning a district court's invocation of its inherent power to grant an ex-
pungement but conceding that other federal courts have exercised such powers in order to
prevent extremely harsh and unusual consequences of a conviction).
24. In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975, 978 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
25. In reV, No. 56033/701 (BIA 1943).
26. In reO T, 41. & N. Dec. 265 (BIA 1951).
27. Id. at 268.
28. In re Phillips, 109 P.2d 344 (Cal. 1941) (finding that expungement alone will not
affect an attorney's disbarment because it is the product of ajudicial decree disciplining an
attorney as an officer of the court rather than a legislative act); Meyer v. Bd. of Med. Exam-
iners et al., 206 P.2d 1085 (Cal. 1949) (extending the Phillips rationale to medical board
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
decided that expungement of a petty theft conviction barred the
deportation of a non-citizen. 9
Eight years after Matter of 0 T, the BIA decided Matter of A F,
which again addressed the effect of California's expungement stat-
ute on a non-citizen's deportability. This time, however, the
underlying offense involved narcotics, and the court also had to
determine whether a non-citizen merely eligible for expungement
should be treated as if an underlying conviction had actually been
expunged.0
In Matter of A F, the BIA referred the case to the Attorney General
of the United States to resolve possible conflicts between the BIA's
rule in Matter of V and recent amendments to the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) whose purpose was to strengthen the
grounds for deportation against non-citizens convicted of narcotics
offenses.3 ' The Attorney General opined that the amendments had
been intended to eliminate both the effect of pardons on offenses
involving narcotics trafficking and sentencing as a prerequisite for
S • 32
determining a conviction. Coupled with the presumed seriousness
of the underlying crime in the case, the Attorney General concluded
that Congress had intended to disregard the effect of expungement
disciplinary proceedings and concluding that such disciplinary, licensing proceedings are
not penalties or disabilities subject to the state's expungement statute).
Both Meyer and Phillips relied upon California's Business and Professions Code that gave
statutory authority to suspend licenses if the licensee commits a crime of moral turpitude
even if there is a subsequent expungement. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 6102(c)
(West 2002).
29. The federal cases cited by the court found that, even if a crime is one of moral
turpitude, the record of a conviction, if expunged, may not be relied upon as a ground for
deportation. See, e.g., In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Cal. 1943); In re Paoli, 49 F.
Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
30. In reA F, 8 1. & N. Dec. 429 (BIA 1959) (concerning a non-citizen who had resided
in the U.S. since 1925 and who was convicted of selling, furnishing, and giving away mari-
juana in violation of § 11500 of the California Health and Safety Code).
31. Id. at 444-45 (discussing the impact of the amendments on the BIA's expunge-
ment rule in the instance of narcotics convictions).
32.
Congress has progressively strengthened the deportation laws dealing with aliens in-
volved in [narcotics] traffic. [Therefore], the deportation statute was amended to
eliminate the requirement that in addition to a conviction there must be a sentence.
At the same time the statute was extended to convictions for violation of State as well
as Federal statutes. And, since the 1956 amendment an alien may no longer escape
deportability by proffering a pardon. In the face of this clear national policy, I do not
believe that the term convicted may be regarded as flexible enough to permit an
alien to take advantage of a technical expungent [sic] which is the product of a state
procedure wherein the merits of the conviction and its validity have no place.
Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
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as a basis of relief from deportation after a narcotics conviction.3"
Of particular importance to the jurisprudence that would emerge
after the IIRIRA, the Attorney General also inferred from legisla-
tive history a preference for a uniform federal definition of a
conviction. 4
In accepting the Attorney General's advice, Matter of A F thus es-
tablished a narrow narcotics exception to the BIA's practice of
providing relief from deportation to non-citizens whose conviction
of a crime had been expunged. It should be noted that, after the
passage of the Federal First Offender Act of 1970, s5 the BIA would
overrule the narcotics exception it had created in Matter ofA F 6
Despite the Attorney General's reasoning in Matter of A F that a
uniform federal definition of conviction was preferable, he did not
ignore state expungement statutes.37 Thus, the principle estab-
lished in Matter of 0 T, that state expungement statutes apply in the
absence of a federal provision, still controlled except for narcotics• • 38
convictions. Matter of A F also makes clear that congressional
amendments are to be interpreted within reasonable parameters
and with textual integrity. These canons of construction normally
discipline administrative discretion to the benefit of removable non-
citizens. Later, the United States Supreme Court would elaborate
another canon of statutory construction of even more direct benefit
to non-citizens: any ambiguities in the INA were to be resolved in
favor of non-citizens, especially if a contrary interpretation would
result in deportation."
33. Id. at 438-41, 445-46.
34. Id. at 446 (citing Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1937), which con-
cerned criminal mail fraud charges and the role of sentencing in determining a
conviction).
35. Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970) [hereinafter First Offender
Act].
36. Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Flavio Eduardo Manrique, 21
I. & N. Dec. 58 (BIA 1995).
37. In re A F, 8 1. & N. Dec. at 442 (citing a ruling by the Attorney General that "while
one cannot close one's eyes to the state's statutes and what transpired in the state's proceedings, we are
inclined to the belief that perhaps here Congress intended to do its own defining rather
than leave the matter to the variable state statutes" (emphasis added)).
38. In re 0 T, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 267 (finding unpersuasive the state Supreme Court's
non-immigration decisions that had given no effect to state expungement of convictions).
39. In re A F, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 444-46 (refusing to recognize state expungements of
certain narcotic offenses in response to explicit language in congressional amendments that
nullified the effect of pardons and the requirement of sentencing).
40. INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (deciding to resolve doubts in favor of a
non-citizen "because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of ban-
ishment or exile"). Accord INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (finding "ordinary canons of statutory construction compelling, even
without regard to the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation
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In addition to the expungement statutes at issue in Matter of 0 T
and Matter of A F, states had begun to develop different procedures
to defer adjudicating guilt, thereby making it more difficult to de-
termine the finality of a conviction.4 Unfortunately, federal
immigration law had not responded with a uniform definition of a
conviction that could reconcile the new and varying state standards
for deferring an adjudication of guilt, Neither Matter of 0 T nor
Matter of A Faddressed state procedures for deferring adjudication.
Instead, those decisions considered only the effect of state ex-
pungement statutes on deportation issues. Not until 1988 did the
BIA craft a definition of conviction that would help ensure the
deportability of non-citizens who had committed similar crimes,
regardless of varying state procedures for adjudicating guilt and
deferring such adjudication.42
In Matter of Ozkok, the BIA recognized that its practice of apply-
ing various state standards for determining a conviction resulted in
an uneven application of immigration law.43 The existing standard
for determining a conviction had three requirements: a finding of
guilt by a court of law; a fine, incarceration, or suspension of an
imposed sentence; and an acknowledgment, by the state, of the
putative "conviction" for at least some purposes.4 Accordingly, for
example, a non-citizen could avoid deportation despite a finding
of guilt if a sentence had been deferred and the sentencing state
did not consider the deferred sentence to be a conviction. On the
other hand, a non-citizen who "pleaded nolo contendere to the
same charge and against whom a formal judgment was entered...
but whose sentence was deferred with no other penalty imposed
statutes in favor of the alien" in deciding to broaden the availability of relief for those who may
not be able to prove that they will "more likely than not" face persecution if removed) (em-
phasis added)).
41. See Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 901 (1955) (per curiam) (ruling on a Massachu-
setts procedure for revoking a sentence and putting a case on file: "On the record here we
are unable to say that the conviction has attained such finality as to support an order of
deportation within the contemplation of § 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.").
See also In re Ozkok, 19 1. & N. Dec. 546, 550 (BIA 1988) (citing varied state procedures for
deferring ajudgment of guilt).
42. In re Ozkok, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 548-50 ("The question of what state action consti-
tutes a conviction with sufficient finality for purposes of the immigration laws is one with
which the Board has wrestled for many years ... procedures vary from state to state and
include provisions for annulling or setting aside the conviction, permitting withdrawal of
the plea, sealing the records after completion of a sentence or probation, and deferring
adjudication of guilt with dismissal of proceedings following a probationary period.").
43. Id. at 550 (stating that "we must acknowledge that the standard which we have ap-
plied to the many variations in state procedure may permit anomalous and unfair results in
determining which aliens are considered convicted for immigration purposes").
44. Id. at 549.
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[might be deported] so long as the state also considered him con-
victed for some purpose. 45 In trying to cure the deficiency, Matter
of Ozkok acknowledged the applicability of both federal and state
authority6 in determining a non-citizen's deportability, given the
need for some measure of uniformity, on one hand, and the state's
role in the underlying conviction, on the other. In particular, the
BIA relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Pino v. Landon,4v which conditioned the finality of a conviction for
immigration purposes on state rather than federal adjudicatory
procedures.
Matter of Ozkok also took into account dictum in Dickerson v. New
Banner Institute, Inc. 4s to the effect that a conviction under the Fed-
eral Gun Control Act4 ' is a question of federal and not state law. In
Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court determined that a state
expungement, by potentially frustrating a congressional goal of
keeping guns out of the hands of dangerous criminals, could not
support relief from a conviction under the Gun Control Act:o
Ironically, Congress later superseded Dickerson by explicitly defer-
ring to state definitions of a conviction in instituting disabilities
under the 1986 Firearm Owners' Protection Act.5 ' Generally, how-
ever, courts may still find the dictum in Dickerson to be persuasive,
even when Congress has not expressly indicated that federal law or
policy should trump the normal state-based standard for determin-
52ing a conviction.
Matter of Ozkok thus struck a balance among Pino, which required
sufficient finality under state law to establish a conviction for depor-
tation purposes; Dickerson, which emphasized the need for
uniformity under federal law in instances of firearm violations; 53 and
45. Id. at 551.
46. See In re Ozkok, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 546; supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (per curiam) (finding that a Massachusetts
procedure for adjudicating guilt did not reach sufficient finality for purposes of immigra-
tion law).
48. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 (1983).
49. Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (h)(1) (1968) [hereinafter Gun
Control Act].
50. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 112.
51. Firearm Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (1986) (forbidding the
institution of federal firearm disabilities once a state has granted an expungement, unless
the expungement statute expressly qualifies its effect on subsequent fitness to own or pos-
sess a firearm) [hereinafter Firearm Act].
52. See In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 522 ("[W]hen Congress has intended for
state law to control in defining when a conviction exists for a federal purpose, it has ex-
pressly said so.").
53. See In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 550-51 (acknowledging that Dickerson, despite
Congress's reversal of its holding, identified varying state procedures and definitions of
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prior BIA cases such as Matter of A F and Matter of 0 T, which
largely gave effect to state expungement statutes to provide relief
from deportation. The BIA's balancing produced the following
three-pronged rule for determining a conviction:
Ajudge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has en-
tered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty;
The judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the person's liberty to be imposed (including but
not limited to incarceration, probation, a fine or restitution,
or community-based sanctions such as a rehabilitation pro-
gram, a work-release or study-release program, revocation or
suspension of a driver's license, deprivation of nonessential
activities or privileges or community service); and
A judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the
person violates the terms of probation or fails to comply with
the requirements of the court's order, without availability of
further proceedings regarding the person's guilt or inno-
cence of the original charge.54
Despite this expression of the BIA's preference for a uniform
federal definition of a conviction, however, the BIA continued to
rely on varying state procedures for deferring adjudication of guilt
and ameliorating the consequences of a conviction.5" Matter of Ozkok
did not speak to these issues. As we shall see in the next section of
this article, Congress later acknowledged this shortcoming of the
Ozkok rule, but did not overrule the established practice of relying
on state expungement to bar deportation of a non-citizen.
what constituted a conviction). See also id. at 550 ("[K]eeping with the opinions of [Pino,
Dickerson, and Matter of A fl, the Board has attempted over the years to reconcile its defini-
tion of a final conviction with the evolving criminal procedures created by various states.").
54. Id. at 551-52.
55. See, e.g., In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 517 (observing that "despite [the
Board's] quest for a definition that would achieve uniform results, in states providing for defer-
ral or withholding of adjudication of guilt, we were still obliged under the Ozkok definition to examine
the individual state's statute to determine the nature of any proceedings that may be convened, if the
alien did not conform with the conditions of his probation. Therefore, how the state sets up
its ameliorative statute still determined to some extent whether aliens who had committed
the same criminal misconduct were considered 'convicted' for immigration purposes"
(emphasis added)).
[VOL. 36:4
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III. THE IIRIRA AND MA7TiER OFROLDAN
A. The IIRIRA and its Legislative History
The IIRIRA specifically incorporated the first two prongs of Oz-
kok in its definition of a conviction." In Matter of Roldan,7 the BIA
came to a questionable interpretation concerning the IIRIRA's de-
letion of the third prong of the Ozkok rule. That prong
conditioned the finding of a conviction solely on whether state
procedures would allow the entry of an automatic judgment when
a convict had violated probation. Matter of Roldan, however, im-
plied that that prong also nullified the benefit of an expungement
of a conviction that served as a basis for removal. Such an infer-
ence is, however, mistaken because Congress never addressed,
recognized, or attempted to reverse the long-established precedent
of the BIA and the courts that had barred removal whenever a
conviction had been expunged. Instead, the IIRIRA provides only
that a non-citizen is considered convicted for purposes of deter-
mining removability once there is a formal judgment or finding of
guilt, an admission of sufficient facts to establish guilt, and an im-
position of some form of punishment or restraint on liberty. 
58
The legislative history of the IIRIRA explains the limited focus,
scope, and aim of the new definition of a conviction. In particular,
an explanatory report to the IIRIRA illustrates why the new defini-
tion "deliberately broadens the scope of 'conviction' beyond that
adopted by the [BIA] in Matter of Ozkok."'59 The report not only
emphasizes the BIA's concern in Matter of Ozkok regarding the
"myriad of [state] provisions for ameliorating the effects of a con-
viction,"6° but concludes that Matter of Ozkok "does not go far
enough to address situations where a judgment of guilt or imposition
of sentence is suspended, conditioned on the alien's future good behavior."6'
56. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A) ("'[C]onviction' means, with respect to an alien, a
formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where ajudge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty
to be imposed."). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 322 (1996) (citing Ozkok as the guiding
principle behind the new definition, but also expressing Congress's disapproval of the third
prong of the Ozkok rnle, which Congress deleted from the new definition of conviction).
57. See text accompanying note 3.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A).
59. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Joint Explanatory Statement).
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
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In instances where adjudication is "deferred," the report contin-
ues, "The third prong of Ozkok denies consideration of the original
finding or confession of guilt as a conviction for removal pur-
poses. 6 2 The last sentence of this portion of the explanatory report
is especially insightful in stating that "this [new definition of con-
viction], by removing the third prong of Ozkok, clarifies
congressional intent that even in cases where adjudication is "deferred, " the
original finding or confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a "convic-
tion "for immigration laws." 3
To be sure, the explanatory report's disapproval of a definition
of conviction that disregards an original finding of guilt might
support an interpretation of the IIRIRA that would reject the nulli-
fying effect of an expungement on a conviction that served as a
basis for removal. Such a broad interpretation would be strained,
however. While the IIRIRA expressly sought to cure the short-
comings of Matter of Ozkok's definition of a conviction, 5 it did not
address, let alone overturn, the long-standing rule that an ex-
pungement would nullify a conviction that had served as a basis for
a "show cause" order of removability. 6' In rejecting the third-prong
of the Ozkok rule, Congress was concerned solely with deferred ad-
judications and suspensions of sentencing rather than with
expungements."Y Not surprisingly, the Congressional list of specific
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added). See also In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 521-22 (rely-
ing, questionably, on scattered quotes such as "original finding or confession of guilt" to
support an interpretation of the new definition of a conviction that would nullify the effect
of state expungement statutes).
64. As long as an arrest and conviction are valid and there is no new evidence regard-
ing a convicted person's innocence, an expungement is granted because the convicted
person exhibits rehabilitation and has met all the terms of probation and not because the
court determines that the person is no longer guilty of having committed an offense.
65. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 224.
66. Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 552 (confirming that, despite a new definition of
conviction, the Board would continue to invalidate removal orders premised on an ex-
punged conviction); Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 E3d 728, 742 n. 23 (9th Cir. 2000)
(stating that "[w]hile Congress specifically commented on the need to eliminate the BIAs
bifurcated rule regarding deferred adjudications, it did not mention the rule, cited with approval
by the BIA in Ozkok, that expunged convictions cannot serve as the basis for deportation" (emphasis
added)). See In re Flavio Eduardo Manrique, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 64 (extending the Board's vali-
dation of expungement as a means to avoid removal to first time drug convictions
expunged under state law but which would have qualified for relief under the Federal First
Offender Act); Matter of Werk, 16 1. & N. Dec. 234, 235 (BIA 1977) (responding to the 1970
Federal First Offender Act as the first BIA decision to recognize the validity of state ex-
pungements for simple, first-time drug convictions); In re Fructoso Luviano-Rodriguez, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 235, 237 (BIA 1996) (finding that an expunged firearms conviction will not sup-
port a finding of deportability).
67. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 742 (finding that the impetus for Congress's new
definition of conviction were state laws regarding deferred or withheld adjudication and
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cases that would henceforth be overruled or superseded by the
IIRIRA does not include any cases on the issue of expungement.1
In view of Matter of Roldan, it is highly unlikely that Congress in-
tended to reverse the BIA's long history of giving effect to
expungement relief without listing a single BIA decision that the
IIRIRA superseded or overruled. The next section deals with the
decision in greater detail.
B. Matter of Roldan
In 1999, three years after the enactment of the IIRIRA, the BIA
decided Matter of Roldan." The case involved a Mexican citizen,
Mauro Roldan-Santoyo, who had resided in the United States since
1982 and had acquired permanent residency in 1988.70 In 1993,
the petitioner pled guilty to possession of more than three ounces
of marijuana, which is a felony in his home state, Idaho. 7' Because
this was Roldan-Santoyo's first controlled substance offense, an
Idaho court sentenced him to a fine and three years' probation.72
In 1994, threatened with deportation, Roldan-Santoyo petitioned
an Idaho state court for an expungement of his offense, based on
his compliance with the terms of probation. When the state of
Idaho did not contest his motion, the court vacated his guilty plea
pursuant to Idaho's expungement statute. 4 The court then
not expungement statutes). See also In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 227 (BIA 1998) (holding
that "it is clear [from the explanatory note] that Congress deliberately modified the defini-
tion of conviction to include deferred adjudications").
68. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 224 (listing two BIA cases that were superseded by the
IIRIRA: In re Castro, 19 I. & N. Dec. 692 (BIA 1988) and In re Esposito, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1
(BIA 1995), both of which concerned the issue of sentencing and the role it played in de-
termining the finality of a conviction).
69. 22 1. & N. Dec. 512 (1999).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 13-14.
72. In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 514 (outlining the terms of Roldan-
Santoyo's probation, which included "restrictions forbidding [the use of] alcohol or [asso-
ciation] with any individuals not approved by the probation officer. The respondent was
also subject to search of his residence, vehicles, and person at his probation officer's re-
quest").
73. Id.
74. Id. See also IDAHO CODE § 19-2604(1) (Michie 2002) (stating that "[i]f sentence has
been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, upon application of the
defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times complied with
the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on probation, the court may... if it be
compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant").
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discharged the petitioner from probation and ordered that
underlying charges be dismissed to the effect that the "defendant
shall not be considered a convicted felon under federal or state laws."7"
Despite the state court's order, the immigration judge ruled that
the petitioner remained convicted for immigration purposes. The
BIA affirmed this order. Purporting to rely on the IIRIRA's explana-
tory report, the BIA held that the Idaho court's expungement of the
petitioner's conviction, under the new definition of a conviction, was
irrelevant. 76 In support of this radical departure from its own long-
standing policy, the BIA cited statements in the explanatory report
that highlighted the importance of an original finding of guilt. The
BIA emphasized that variance among state laws and procedures for
ameliorating the effects of a conviction posed a threat to a uniform
application of immigration law. The BIA therefore applied what it
called Dickerson's "long-standing" rule of the previous decade that
the definition of a conviction, including any amelioration of it, is a
question of federal, not state law.77
The BIA's jarringly new analysis raised important issues. First, its
selective use of an explanatory report as legislative history may
have missed essential points in the report.78 For example, the BLA
relied on a portion of the explanatory report to the effect that "the
original finding or confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a
conviction for purposes of immigration laws., 79 The report itself
explains, however, that the new definition was concerned solely
with deferral of an adjudication of guilt.80 In Matter of Punu, by
75. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 733 (consolidating the appeals of petitioners Roldan-
Santoyo and Lujan-Armendariz) (quoting the state court's order) (emphasis added).
76. In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 523.
77. Id. at 516. In Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 111-12, the United States Supreme Court held
that "[w]hether one has been 'convicted' within the language of the gun control statutes is
necessarily ... a question of federal, not state law, despite the fact that the predicate offense
and its punishment are defined by the law of the State."
78. In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 518 (focusing on words such as "ameliora-
tive statutes," and "original findings" "of guilt" instead of analyzing the statute as a whole). A
dissenting opinion in Matter of Roldan counseled that "[r]ather than quoting selectively from
the legislative history of [the IIRIRAI to determine its intended scope, it is both appropriate
and necessary to rely on the entire legislative history underlying the statute." Id. at 530. (Gus-
tavo C. Villageliu, Board Member, dissenting and concurring) (emphasis added).
79. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 224. See also In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 518
(concluding that "it is clear that Congress intends that an alien be considered convicted,
based on an initial finding or admission of guilt").
80. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 742 n.23 (addressing the explanatory report for the
IIRIRA in dicta and finding that it "did not mention the rule, cited with approval by the BIA in
Ozkok, that expunged convictions cannot serve as the basis for deportation. Thus, it appears that
Congress was concerned primarily, as the BIA had been, with the question whether aliens
could be deported during the period that followed a determination of guilt but preceded the
expungement of the offense" (emphasis added)).
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contrast, the BIA had already acknowledged that the issue of de-
ferred adjudications was the impetus for the IIRIRA's crude
definition of a conviction."'
In addition, the BIA's strained reading of the IIRIRA seems to
contradict the canon of construction that statutes should be inter-
preted and read as a whole in order to achieve the result intended
by Congress.82 As the strongly worded dissent in Matter of Roldan
indicates, neither the IIRIRA's explanatory report nor the act's ex-
press statutory definition of a conviction support the decision.83
A second question mark hanging over Matter of Roldan involves
the consistency of its Dickerson (uniformity) rationale with the Fire-
arm Act that superseded Dickerson.4 The Firearm Act, though
premised in a principle of national uniformity, is a clear indication
that Congress recognized state procedures such as expungement
to be significant qualifications on federal determinations of a state
conviction.85 Such recourse to state law makes good sense insofar
as "Congress has not [yet] provided a general expungement stat-
ute."86 From this perspective, it is highly questionable whether a
non-citizen should be removed from the United States, perhaps
forever, simply to vindicate the principle of legislative uniformity,
in the absence of any express language within the IIRIRA requir-
ing that result.
Third, Matter of Roldan's reliance on the new principle of federal
uniformity unfortunately subordinated the hallowed principle of
precedent, in this instance, going back over fifty years. Moreover,
the BIA's reading of the IIRIRA is valid only if state-deferred adju-
dications and state expungement statutes are lumped together as a
single qualification of conviction. The two types of relief, however,
are like apples and oranges. Expungement statutes are different
81. In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 227 (concluding that "it is clear that Congress de-
liberately modified the definition of conviction to include deferred adjudications").
82. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as
well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."). See also Wash. Dep't of Soc. &
Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 123 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 n.7 (2003) (caution-
ing that interpretations of congressional legislation should not violate "the cardinal rule
that a statute is to be read as a whole") (quoting King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221
(1991) (emphasis added)).
83. In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 537-41 (Rosenberg, Board Member, dis-
senting).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (20) (forbidding the institution of firearm disabilities on an ex-
punged conviction).
85. Firearm Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 921 (a) (20) (leaving the definition of a
conviction to be determined by state law and invalidating the use of expunged convictions
to institute firearm ownership disabilities).
86. See Diehm, supra note 21, at 80.
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from deferred adjudications because they do not simply delay the
pronouncement or finding of guilt but definitively reward and facili-
tate the rehabilitation of a once-guilty individual. 7 Expungement,
therefore, serves the important purpose of criminal justice that is
defeated by federal second-guessing in the name of federal uniform-
ity. Deferring adjudication of guilt, on the other hand, simply
represents an initial step that may lead to formal expungement s In
such instances the state has not certified or attested to the con-
victed person's rehabilitation and has not taken any steps to
protect the conviction and the convicted person.
Given the importance of determining finality (or not) of convic-
tions, the risk of uneven or anomalous results arising from varying
state laws is therefore more acute in the instance of a deferral stat-
ute. Expungement, on the other hand, provides a bright line of
finality by, in effect, sealing or obliterating the record of a convic-
tion or finding of guilt or by vacating and reversing it.8° A person's
status is both clear and "final" under a state expungement statute.
Although expungement statutes differ in many respects,9° they all
87. See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 736 n.13 (distinguishing between an expunge-
ment order and a deferral of adjudication). See also Franklin & Johnsen, supra note 7, at
737-38 (finding that expungement statutes seek either to reward a convicted person's reha-
bilitation or otherwise to facilitate it by eliminating discrimination or continued
punishment via public opinion); id. at 742 (illustrating that the original goal of expunge-
ment was to aid rehabilitation by preventing public knowledge of an offender's record).
88. In re A F, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 439 (distinguishing between eligibility for and actual at-
tainment of expungement: "there is [nothing] repugnant about the fact that an alien can
be deported prior to the expungement of the conviction and cannot be deported if the
conviction has been expunged before deportation takes place").
89. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640 (demonstrating the effect of a successful
expungement: "the fact that the offender has been convicted of the offense shall not be
included in the offender's criminal history for purposes of determining a sentence in any
subsequent conviction, and the offender shall be released from all penalties and disabilities
resulting from the offense. For all purposes, including responding to questions on em-
ployment applications, an offender whose conviction has been vacated may state that the offender
has never been convicted of that crime." (emphasis added)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West
2003) (illustrating that a successful expungement petition enables the petitioner to "with-
draw his or her plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if
he or she has been convicted after a plea of not guilty," it mandates "the court [to set] aside
the verdict of guilty"). See also Mayfield, supra note 6, at 1057 ("The concept of expunging
criminal records is referred to by different names, but entails the destruction or sealing of a
criminal record when the offender completes certain requirements.").
90. See Carlton J. Snow, Expungement and Employment Law: The Conflict Between an Em-
ployer's Need to Know About Juvenile Misdeeds and An Employee's Need to Keep Them Secret, 41
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 21-22 (1992) ("[T]here is no uniform terminology in
the world of expungement statutes ... A majority ofjurisdictions use either the term 'seal-
ing' or 'expungement.' "). See also Franklin &Johnsen, supra note 7, at 742 (explaining that
"expungement procedures vary, but in general, conviction and related criminal records
concerning the convict are collected, sealed, segregated, open only to limited inspection,
obliterated, or actually physically destroyed").
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require a "uniform" showing of rehabilitation and exclude serious
offenses from eligibility." Criticism of expungement statutes cen-
ters not on the varying legal processes by which state courts reverse
or remove a prior conviction but on whether, in practical terms, ex-
pungement adequately protects a successful petitioner who has
reentered a society that may demand access to the convicted per-
son's criminal record.'
Another question mark looming over Matter of Roldan relates to
its congruence with Dickerson, upon which it relies, as a basis for
preferring a federal standard. Dickerson involved a federal firearm
statute with sanctions much less significant than removal from the
country. In addition, the BIA failed fully to appreciate that, in en-
acting the Firearm Act,9 Congress had rejected the Dickerson
dictum. Matter of Roldan only noted this important point in passing
rather than relying on it, even though, since Dickerson and until
1999, both the BIA and federal courts had interpreted pertinent
federal acts to incorporate state expungement relief. 94 These cases
91. Mayfield, supra note 6, at 1057-59 ("The prerequisites for successfully petitioning
a court for expungement vary by jurisdiction; however, they generally require the petitioner to
demonstrate rehabilitation," and "[o]ften these statutes prohibit courts from expunging serious
crimes." (emphasis added)).
92. See Pettier & Hilmen, supra note 13, at 134 (arguing that once a state certifies a
person's "[fitness] to resume his [or her] former position in society on an equal footing
with the rest of its members ... disclosure of criminal records results in the deprivation of
[that] equality"); Portnoy, supra note 12, at 306-12 (outlining the practical difficulties facing
a person whose conviction has been expunged); Franklin &Johnsen, supra note 7, at 749-
69 (finding that expungement statutes that prevent access to a criminal record may have
various costs such as fostering dishonesty and the curtailment of legal and constitutional
rights such as the fight to information); Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing
and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
378, 378 (1970) (claiming that sealing of records may actually do more harm than good by
the "hoax it plays upon ex-offenders and the general public"); Snow, supra note 90, at 3
(explaining that there exists a "tension between an employer's need to know about an ap-
plicant's background and an applicant's right to keep relevant information confidential").
93. This observation is inferred from Congress's enactment of the Firearm Act, 18
U.S.C. § 921 (2002) (authorizing state definitions of a "conviction" to control its provisions
and expressly invalidating the use of expunged convictions to institute firearm disabilities)
as well as In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 227 (concluding that "it is clear that Congress
deliberately modified the definition of conviction to include deferred adjudications"). See
also In re Flavio Eduardo Manrique, 21 1. & N. Dec. 58, 62-64 (adopting an interpretation of
the Federal First Offender Act that relied upon Congressional intent to alleviate the conse-
quences of a narcotics conviction through expungement relief).
94. In re Devison, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1362, 1368 (BIA 2000) ("Applying the [Federal juve-
nile Delinquency Act] as a benchmark, we find that a youthful offender adjudication under
Article 720 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law corresponds to a determination of
juvenile delinquency under the FJDA."); In re Flavio Eduardo Manrique, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 64
("[A]n[y] alien who has been accorded rehabilitative treatment pursuant to a state statute
will not be removed if he establishes that he would have been eligible for [relief] under the
provisions of [the Federal First Offender Act] had he been prosecuted under federal law.").
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demonstrate that the BIA ordinarily seeks to avoid reversing oth-
erwise long-standing rules and practices when Congress does not
so require. 95
Lastly, Matter of Roldan also ignored Pino's accommodation of a
state interpretation of the term "conviction," relying instead on the
Dickerson dictum, even though that decision did not involve immi-
gration law. Additionally, the BIA misconstrued its prior holding in
Matter of Ozkok and that decision's reliance on Dickerson. Matter of
Ozkok did not argue that the policy of federal uniformity should
result in the exclusion of state law on the effect of expungement.
Instead, Matter of Ozkok simply struck a balance between state and
federal laws because of what was increasingly seen to be a necessary
recourse to state statutes and provisions for shaping the outcome
of federal removal cases."
IV.JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO MATTER OFROLDAN
A. Lujan-Armendariz
Two years after the BIA decided Matter of Roldan, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reviewed that decision on appeal. In Lujan-
Armendariz v. I.N.S.,97 the Court ruled that Roldan-Santoyo's ex-
punged, first-time state narcotics conviction could not be the
predicate for a removal order because the underlying offense would
have been eligible for amelioration under the First Offender Act as
well.98 On its face, the First Offender Act applied its ameliorative
provision for all purposes, which, according to Lujan-Armendariz,
95. In reDevison, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1369 ("Presumably, Congress was aware of our long-
established policy and of the [Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act's] provisions that maintain
a distinction between juvenile delinquencies and criminal convictions. There is no record
of an effort or intention on the part of Congress to include acts ofjuvenile delinquency in
this new definition of the term 'conviction.' ").
96. See generally Nathalie A. Bleuz6, Matter of Roldan: Expungement of Conviction and the
Role of States in Immigration Matters, 72 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 817, 840-849 (2001) (arguing that
Matter of Roldan was erroneously decided because of the increased state participation in
immigration matters, increased costs of immigration borne by states' law enforcement and
judiciary, increased federal reliance on state laws in order to determine removability of non-
citizens, and the disproportionate effect that the Board's new rule invalidating expunge-
ment was having on a family unit that is disrupted by the removal of a contributing
member).
97. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 728 (considering on appeal the consolidated BIA
decisions regarding non-citizens Roldan-Santoyo and Lujan-Armendariz).
98. Id. at 735.
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included removal proceedings.9 Lujan-Armendariz thereby con-
firmed the compulsion of a federal rehabilitation scheme to nullify
an order of removal based solely on a criminal conviction that had
been expunged.' °
The decision also held that the IIRIRA's definition of conviction
did not repeal the First Offender Act's protection against removal
because the IIRIRA did not address the effect of expungements at
all.'0 ' The court found the BIA's argument to the contrary "highly
99. Id. (finding that "[the Federal First Offender Act] is a limited federal rehabilita-
tion statute that permits first-time drug offenders who commit the least serious type of drug
offense to avoid the drastic consequences which typically follow a finding of guilt in drug
cases ... [u]nder the Act, the finding of guilt is expunged and no legal consequences may be
imposed as a result of the defendants having committed the offense. The Act's ameliorative
provisions apply for all purposes" (emphasis added)). See also First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3607(c) (entitled "Expungement of Record of Disposition," and providing that "[a] per-
son concerning whom [an expungement order has been] entered shall not be held
thereafter under any provision of law to be guilty of perjury, false swearing, or making a
false statement by reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge such arrests or institution of
criminal proceedings, or the results thereof, in response to an inquiry made of him for any
purpose").
100. Since Lujan-Armendariz, only two other federal circuits have directly addressed and
adopted the Board's new rule regarding the effect on removability of expungement statutes:
Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 304 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a Puerto Rican court's
order of exoneration does not provide cancellation of removal) and Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d
574, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the Lujan-Armendariz analysis whether the First
Offender Act was repealed by the IIRIRA "makes no difference, for state offenders such as
[petitioner] ... that law applies only to persons prosecuted in federal courts ... The hold-
ing of Lujan-Armendariz, which elevates an abandoned [BIA] practice [of formulating an
adjudicative definition of a conviction] over a statutory text [(the IIRIRA's new definition)],
is untenable, and we decline to follow it"). Other circuits have not directly addressed the
issue. See Vasquez-Velezmoro v. INS, 281 F.3d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 2002) (observing that
whether the IIRIRA's definition of conviction repeals the First Offender Act "is an unsettled
question" before going on to dismiss the petitioner's equal protection argument because
petitioner's situation is not sufficiently similar to one who is eligible for the act's first of-
fender (expungement) relief); United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1999)
(analyzing the effect of a vacated conviction on sentencing guidelines under the Dickerson
preference for a federal instead of state standard for a non-citizen who had illegally re-
entered the country). See also In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 245 (BIA 2002)
(Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting) ("Other circuit courts have acknowledged the
Ninth Circuit's decision [in Lujan-Armendariz], but appear not to have adopted its ruling for case-
specific reasons." (emphasis added)). The following cases were cited by Board Member
Rosenberg: Fernandez-Bernal v. Attorney General of the U.S., 257 E3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001)
(finding that while Matter of Roldan was questionable, the petitioner would not have been
eligible for relief under the First Offender Act); Sandoval v. INS, 240 E3d 577, 583 (7th Cir.
2001) (observing that Lujan-Armendariz's rejection of Roldan weakened the BIA's interpreta-
tion of the IIRIRA); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 61 n.12 (2d Cir. 2001) (distinguishing
Lujan-Armendariz because of the lack of analogous federal ameliorative legislation).
101. E.g., Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 745 (finding that "there is no irreconcilable
conflict between the [First Offender Act and the IIRIRA], and therefore no basis for finding
an implied repeal. We need only construe the later- enacted immigration law as subject to
the minor exception required by the provisions of the earlier-enacted First Offender Act").
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unpersuasive,"' '° observing that "[the IIRIRA itself] did not men-
tion the [existing] rule ... that expunged convictions cannot serve as
the basis for removal."10 3 Instead, the Court found that Congress's pri-
mary concern in legislating the new definition of conviction was to
establish the removability of non-citizens "during the period that
followed a determination of guilt but preceded the expungement of the
offense.""°4 More importantly, the court also noted that Congress did
not "[attempt] to alter the longstanding [BIA] rule that convictions
that are subsequently overruled, vacated, or otherwise erased no
longer have any effect for immigration or most other purposes."" Lujan-
Armendariz thus questioned the rationale of Matter of Roldan and its
invalidation of long-standing BIA precedent.
After Lujan-Armendariz, the BIA itself seems to have abandoned
the uniformity argument it had so rigorously defended in Matter of
Roldan. In Matter of Salazar-Regino, for example, the BIA an-
nounced that it would selectively confer the Lujan-Armendariz
benefit for first-time narcotics offenses only on those non-citizens
whose criminal records had been expunged within the jurisdiction
of the Ninth Circuit.'
0 6
B. Murrillo-Espinoza
Murrillo-Espinoza concerned a Mexican citizen, Juan Manuel
Murrillo-Espinoza, who had been admitted to the United States as
a permanent resident in 1961.107 Thirty-four years later he was con-
victed in Arizona on one count of theft and placed on three years
probation with six months incarceration in countyjail.'0 s The INS
subsequently commenced proceedings, during which Murrillo-
Espinoza admitted his removability. After the immigration judge
ordered his removal, Murillo-Espinoza appealed the order to the
BIA'09 and also obtained a state court order vacating his judgment
102. Id. at 742.
103. Id. at n.23 (emphasis added).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 233 (BIA 2002) ("Accordingly, we decline
to give the holding in Lujan-Armendariz v. INS nationwide application and will continue to
apply the rule set forth in Matter of Roldan to cases arising outside the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit.").
107. Murrilo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 772-73 (9th Cir. 2001).
108. Id. at 772.
109. Id. at 772-73.
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of guilt and dismissing the theft charge. As in Matter of Roldan,
however, the BIA refused to give effect to the expungement of his
conviction.
Unlike Lujan-Armendariz, Murrillo-Espinoza did not involve the
First Offender Act with its explicit provision for expungement of a
first narcotics conviction. Murrillo-Espinoza therefore presented the
court with an opportunity to determine the merits of the BIA's new
rule ignoring the effect of a state expungement of a non-narcotic
conviction, which Lujan-Armendariz had characterized as a "highly
unpersuasive" interpretation of the IIRIRA." ° Initially, Murrillo-
Espinoza seemed to concur, finding that the new interpretation was
not "the only plausible one [possible],""' but the decision did not
overturn the Roldan rule. Instead, the court, in a short opinion,
relied on the Chevron doctrine, which it had found no occasion to
apply in Lujan-Armendariz, to uphold the BIA's new rule.
l
1
Murillo-Espinoza failed to discuss whether the IIRIRA's definition
of a conviction actually addressed the issue of expungement (as it
did not). Nor did the opinion determine whether the BIA's inter-
pretation reflected a clear intent of Congress, even though Chevron
requires a court to ask "how clear"'"1 3 a statute is in order to warrant
administrative fiat. 1 14 The opinion also overlooked the rule that "a
consistent administrative construction of [a] statute must be fol-
lowed by ... courts unless there are compelling indications [from
Congress] that it is wrong."' 5 Applying this requirement to immi-
gration cases, the United States Supreme Court instead found that
"an [immigration] agency interpretation that conflicts with earlier
110. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 742.
111. Murillo-Espinoza, 261 F.3d at 774.
112. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. . Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (holding that an agency's interpretation of a statute must be ac-
corded deference where Congress has left a gap for it to fill or where it makes a reasonable
interpretation of a provision that is ambiguous or uncertain). See also United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (ruling that Chevron deference is mandated only when
Congress delegates to an agency the authority to issue interpretations that carry the force of
law).
113. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DuKEs LJ. 511, 520-21 (1989) (predicting future conflicts as to judicial determinations of
how the Chevron doctrine's initial requirement of ambiguity is met).
114. Id. at 517 (finding that "the quest for 'genuine' legislative intent is probably a wild-
goose chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases ... Congress neither (1) intended a single
result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn't think
about the matter at all").
115. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) (emphasis added). See also Yotngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (finding that congressional acquies-
cence may reinforce the exercise of presidential powers) (Uackson,J., concurring).
SUMMER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
interpretations is entitled to considerably less deference."'1 6 Even
more fundamental is whether the Chevron doctrine applies at all to
changes in immigration law instituted by the BIA's interpretation
of Congressional amendments. After all, two recent United States
Supreme Court decisions addressing the civil liberties of non-
citizen detainees under the immigration service's interpretation of
the IIRIRA did not rely on the Chevron doctrine."7
Instead, Murillo-Espinoza might have more carefully considered
whether the BIA's interpretation conformed with "a body of ex-
perience and informed judgment" upon which courts ordinarily
should rely."8 At a minimum, in light of the BIA's sharp departure
from precedent, the court should have considered the policy con-
sequences of withholding cancellation of removal. Such a
consideration is, after all, a valid tool of statutory construction that
courts are encouraged to employ before addressing an administra-
tive agency's action under federal legislation." 9 In essence, the
serious consequences of removal and the ambiguities in the
IIRIRA should have persuaded the Murillo-Espinoza court to resolve
the issue of expungement in favor of the petitioner.1  Murrillo-
Espinoza's application of the Chevron doctrine as a basis for apply-
ing Matter of Roldan is therefore highly questionable.
116. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447 n.30 (1987).
117. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See also Marga-
ret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of Litigation,
16 GEo. IMMIBR. L.J. 271, 309 (2002) (observing, "there is the curious fact that-just one
week after Mead was decided-both St. Cyr and Zadvydas considered policy that was embod-
ied in regulation without invoking Chevron. The Zadvydas decision did not even mention the
Chevron doctrine, while St. Cyr simply dropped a footnote rejecting the INS's argument that Chevron
deference should apply" (emphasis added)).
118. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (delineating the so-called
Skidmore deference where a court may choose, but is not required, to defer to an agency
interpretation). See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legiti-
macy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 536 (2003) (summarizing the
standards for agency deference under Skidmore and Mead). See also supra note 112 and ac-
companying text.
119. Scalia, supra note 112, at 515 (arguing that "the traditional tools of statutory con-
struction include not merely text and legislative history but also ... consideration of policy
consequences. Indeed, that tool is so traditional that it has been enshrined in Latin: Ratio
est legis anima; mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex").
120. St. Cyr 533 U.S. at 320; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449.
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C. Ramirez-Castro
1. The Facts-Ramirez-Castro v. LN.S. involved a Honduran citi-
zen, Jos6 Roberto Ramirez-Castro, who had resided in the U.S.
since 1978 and had acquired permanent residency in 1989. ' In
1991, a California court convicted him of carrying a concealed
weapon, a misdemeanor under California law, and imposed a sen-
tence of 65 days in prison. 12 2 It might be noted that Ramirez-
Castro's concealed weapons charge was not prosecuted under the
Firearm Act.
Subsequently, the INS issued a removal order against him based
on the firearm conviction. Ramirez-Castro appealed this decision to
the BIA.'2 3 Pending an appeal hearing, the California court ex-
punged the petitioner's conviction. As in Matter of Roldan, however,
the BIA ignored the state's rehabilitation law and upheld Ramirez-
Castro's removal order, finding again that the expungement of a
conviction was irrelevant in a petition for cancellation of removal.
12 4
The petitioner then sought relief in the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which remanded the case for reconsideration by the BIA.
After the BIA reiterated its construction of the IIRIRA, the peti-
tioner again went before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 25 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the BIA's interpretation of
the IIRIRA's definition of conviction.1
6
2. Deference to the BIA Despite Lujan-Armendariz-The Ramirez-
Castro court interpreted both Lujan-Armendariz, which gave effect
to an expungement in a removal proceeding, and Murillo-
Espinoza, which did not. Relying on Murillo-Espinoza, the court
held that, in the absence of some "other yet, unrecognized, excep-
tion," the Chevron doctrine requires deference to the BIA's
interpretation of the IIRIRA1
27
121. Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1173.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1173.
125. Id.
126. Since Ramirez-Castro, the Ninth Circuit has extended its adoption of the BIA's new
rule to a non-citizen's ability to demonstrate good moral character on the basis of an ex-
pungement of a conviction. De La Torre-Salazar v. INS, 36 Fed.Appx. 252, 253 (9th Cir.
2002) ("Under IIRIRA, however, this expungement does not affect the consequences of the
conviction for purposes of the deportation laws ... Thus, the conviction made de la Torre
statutorily ineligible to demonstrate good moral character for purposes of obtaining a sus-
pension of deportation." (citing Ramirez-Castro and Murillo-Espinoza)).
127. Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1174-75.
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Addressing Lujan-Armendariz, the Ramirez-Castro court noted that
the petitioner's firearm conviction did not fall under any specific
federal statutory exception. 128 The court ruled that neither the
IIRIRA's definition of a conviction nor any other source of law re-
quired the BLA to distinguish between expunged misdemeanor
and felony convictions. Moreover, the court determined that the
mere existence of limited qualifications in California's expunge-
ment statute supported the BIA's refusal to give effect to
expungement even though the qualifications had nothing directly
to do with immigration or other federal law.1
29
The court's conditioning of relief on explicit statutory author-
ity 30 is puzzling. Unlike Ramirez-Castro, Lujan-Armendariz relied on a
federal statute not because the court thought it always had to find
such a statute to justify cancellation of removal, but simply because
the applicable statute so provided. Nowhere did Lujan-Armendariz
seek to limit all expungement relief in removal cases to federal
statutory acknowledgement of such relief. Indeed, the First Of-
fender Act at issue in Lujan-Armendariz does not contain any
express language about immigration proceedings. Nor does it ex-
pressly give effect to state expungement statutes. 3 ' Lujan-
Armendariz established that the First Offender Act was intended to
ameliorate the effect of simple drug-related convictions at a time
of growing anxiety about the prevalence of drug use. Congress's
response was to provide specific statutory relief for otherwise law-
abiding first offenders of drug laws.
32
This policy of ameliorating the harsh consequences of a first-
time conviction should also have informed the same court's
decision in Ramirez-Castro, even in the absence of a federal statute
to that effect. 33 It is significant that in Ramirez-Castro and
128. Id. at 1175.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1174 (requiring the petitioner to demonstrate that his expungement fell
under the Lujan-Armendariz exception in order to prevail in his appeal to the court).
131. Two decisions have construed the act to apply to deportation proceedings: Gar-
berding, 30 E3d at 1190-91 (concluding that the underlying offense and not the state
expungement statute's similarity to the Federal First Offender Act is dispositive in determin-
ing a convicted non-citizen's eligibility for relief under that Act) and In re Flavio Eduardo
Manrique, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 62 (reversing its precedent to reflect the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Garberding).
132. See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 735.
133. In the Dillingham v. INS decision, the Lujan-Armendariz court gave immigration ef-
fect to a foreign expungement of a first-time narcotics conviction. Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d
996 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a British expungement statute is analogous to relief under
the First Offender Act, and is, therefore, subject to the Lujan-Armendariz exception to the
BIAs new rule).
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Lujan-Armendariz, long-time residents faced the possibility of being
forced to leave their homes, possibly forever, because of a single
criminal conviction. The stark contrast of outcomes for the
respective non-citizens in the two cases is difficult tojustify.
The court's new requirement of an explicit statutory provision
for amelioration from a conviction is all the more puzzling when
one considers that, even before the enactment of the First Of-
fender Act, the BIA had generally given effect to expungement
statutes except in a narrow (and subsequently superseded) area
when the underlying offense involved a narcotics violation. 34 The
court-fashioned requirement of a specific statutory exception is
fundamentally unfair both because there is no federal expunge-
ment statute and because the First Offender Act is one of only two
federal statutes with adult expungement provisions.'
3
5
3. The Refusal to Distinguish a Felony from a Misdemeanor-
Ramirez-Castro's ruling that the BIA need not treat expunged felo-
nies differently from expunged misdemeanors' 36 also disregards
provisions in the Firearm Act that distinguish between misde-
meanors and felonies 13 and require that a state expungement
statute be taken into account.13 Although that legislation did not
directly apply in Ramirez-Castro, it is unfortunate that the court
failed to explain why the same distinction between felony and mis-
demeanor convictions should not be controlling in a state firearms
case.
California's expungement statute, which was at issue in Ramirez-
Castro, has two parts. The first part deals generally with convic-
tions 131 whereas the second applies only to misdemeanors.'4  The
second part of the statute bears on the case because an expunged
134. In re A F, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 444-46 (finding express indications that Congress in-
tended to nullify the deportation relief that expungement might have on deportability of
narcotics offenders).
135. The other federal legislation addressing expungement of adult convictions is the
Firearm Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921. See also Diehm, supra note 21, at 80 n.26
(listing the two federal statutes that provide adult expungement provisions and observing
that there is no all-encompassing federal expungement statute).
136. 287F.3dat1175.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (20) (demonstrating that "crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year does not include... any State offense classified by the laws of
the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less"
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (20) (stating that "[a] conviction which has been expunged ...
shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, ex-
pungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship,
transport, possess, or receive firearms").
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4.
140. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1203.4a (West 2002).
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misdemeanor conviction does not impair a convicted person's sub-
sequent ability to own or possess a firearm."' Of course, merely
because state laws treat expunged misdemeanors differently from
expunged felonies, federal agencies need not do the same. But,
California's statutory distinction is entirely compatible with specific
portions of the IIRIRA and the Firearm Act. In fact, the IIRIRA
utilizes the Firearm Act to supply the definition of "aggravated fel-
ony.' 4 2 The IIRIRA also relies on the Firearm Act's listing of the
types of firearm convictions that may determine removability. 3
Despite this reliance on the Firearm Act, the IIRIRA does not qual-
ify the Act's provision for state-based expungement relief.
Normally, a petitioner's expunged conviction, and the classifica-
tion of his underlying offense as a misdemeanor, would relieve the
petitioner from federal firearm disabilities. 144
It is instructive, at this point, to step back and consider Ramirez-
Castro in the larger picture of federal regulation of firearms. Al-
though the Firearm Act would trust the petitioner to possess,
transport, or sell a firearm despite conviction, Ramirez-Castro would
insist on removal because of it. Surely Congress did not intend to
make that kind of distinction, even if a distinction between citizens
and non-citizens is appropriate in immigration law. Such a result
would seem to run afoul of rules of statutory construction, that
courts should either refer to prior related statutes - in pari materia -
or, if the statutes are unrelated, to those provisions that apply to
similar persons in order to facilitate a reasonable interpretation of
congressional intent. 14 5 It is unfortunate that Ramirez-Castro does
141. Id. § 1203.4a (applying expungement relief to misdemeanor convictions for which
probation was not granted after the lapse of one year from the date of ajudgment).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (c) (defining aggravated firearm felony as an "illicit traffick-
ing in firearms... as defined in [the Firearm Owners' Protection Act]").
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(c) (1996) (finding deportable, any non-citizen who is con-
victed "under any law" for selling, purchasing, owning, carrying, possessing or conspiring to
do any of the preceding with regard to "a firearm or destructive device as defined in [the
Firearm Owners' Protection Act]").
144. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(20) (stating that a "conviction which has been expunged.., shall
not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess,
or receive firearms" (emphasis added)); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) (allowing for the imposition
of federal firearm disabilities on anyone "convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one yea?" (emphasis added)); 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (20) (B)
(defining "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year does not in-
clude-any state offense classified by the laws of the state as a misdemeanor and punishable by a
term of imprisonment of two years or less" (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
added)).
145. "Statutes are in pari materia when they are related to the same persons or things
or to the same class of persons or things; therefore, if possible, they must be construed to-
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not attempt to identify a policy basis for differentiating between
the expungement-supportive provisions of the First Offender Act
and the Firearm Act, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the
controlling rationale, drawn from Matter of Roldan, for nullifying
the immigration-related effect of a state's expungement of its own
conviction of a non-citizen.
1 4
4. Discretionary Waivers and Expungement-Ramirez-Castro, fueled
by Chevron, compounded the BIA's questionable interpretation of
the IIRIRA by minimizing the task of legislative construction. Sev-
eral express provisions of the IIRIRA had already eliminated
discretionary waiver relief to documented permanent residents
facing removal, 147 thereby leaving a convicted non-citizen without a
remedy or voice to oppose something as liberty-threatening as re-
moval once he or she has been convicted of a crime.1
48
To avoid unfair and harsh results, however, the United States
Supreme Court later ruled, in LN.S. v. St. Cyr, that the IIRIRA's ex-
press restrictions on discretionary waivers could not be applied
retroactively because there was no clear indication that Congress
intended such a result.4 9 In contrast to the St. Cyr decision, both
gether as one statute." Patrice Wade, Court: College Must Remit to State Employees' Retirement
System, 5 LAW. J. 2, 12 (June 13, 2003). See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756
(1979) (finding common purpose and similar language of two acts requires an identical
interpretation); Overstreet v. No. Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1943) (resolving am-
biguities by using language in statutes that apply to similar persons as the statute in
question). See also Aharon Barak, Foreword, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in
a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 76 (2002) ("An interpreter may derive the objective pur-
pose of a statute not only from the statute itself, but also from closely related statutes
addressing the same issue [in pari material.").
146. Even though the IIRIRA is the more recent, and, arguably, the more general of
the three statutes, where there is no clear congressional intention, a specific statute will not
be nullified by a more general one. In addition, two or more statutes that are capable of co-
existence should each be regarded as effective. SeeJ.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int'l., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138 (2001); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
147. Discretionary waivers had given a non-citizen an opportunity to challenge deporta-
tion before an administrative judge. Typically, family and community members were able to
make appearances and even testify on behalf of the non-citizen so that the BIA would no
longer seek deportation measures. The IIRIRA eliminated discretionary waivers for legal
permanent residents convicted on or after April 1, 1997. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996).
148. The harsh effect of the IIRIRA's proscription on the availability of discretionary
waivers is highlighted by removal orders despite strong family attachments. E.g., In re Sala-
zar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 223 (deciding to remove Estella Salazar-Regino, a lawful
permanent resident for over 20 years, on the basis of her expunged marijuana conviction
despite her familial attachment to the United States). Without expungement or discretion-
ary waiver relief, immigration law disregards a non-citizen's linguistic, familial and
communal attachments to this country; evidence of their rehabilitation; probation officers'
recommendations; the seriousness of the crime; and the circumstances of its commission.
149. St. Cyr 533 U.S. 289 (preserving discretionary waiver relief if the convicted legal
permanent resident committed an offense prior to the IIRIRA's enactment). See also
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the BIA's interpretation of the IIRIRA in Matter of Roldan and the
Ninth Circuit's approval of it in Ramirez-Castro are unnecessarily
harsh. In the language of St. Cyr, it is difficult to identify a "clearly
expressed statement"'5° that Congress intended to give no effect to
a state expunged conviction during a non-citizen's removal pro-
ceeding.
5. The Role of States and Legislated Qualifications to Expungement-
Ramirez-Castro observed that California's expungement statute does
not prevent a decision by the Department of Motor Vehicles to re-
voke or suspend a convicted person's driving privileges. 51 The
court concluded that this qualification supported "[the BIA's rea-
sonable conclusion] that a conviction expunged under that
provision [similarly] remains a conviction for purposes of federal
law."0
52
This conclusion is puzzling in that the mere existence of a quali-
fication on the ameliorative effect of expungement elsewhere in
California's statutes is of little relevance. What does a vehicle code
have to do with immigration law? At the very least, the Ramirez-
Castro court should have attempted to explicate this relationship. It
would seem that the serious consequences of removal from the
United States should be of much greater judicial concern than the
relatively minor disabilities that may arise from a continuing re-




The special disabilities in the vehicle code make good sense be-
cause expungement may justifiably serve to restore a driver to pre-
conviction status, as with an act of clemency, without recertifying,
however, that he or she has become a skilled driver. 1 4 Nor should
expungement foreclose the state from ascertaining an individual's
Executive Office for Immigration Review;, Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens With Certain Criminal
Convictions Before April 1, 1997, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,627 (Aug. 13, 2002) (proposing a new rule
consistent with St. Cyr that allows legal permanent residents to file for relief if pertinent
crimes were committed prior to 1997).
150. St. Cyr 533 U.S. at 314.
151. Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1175. See also CAL. VEH. CODE § 13555 (West 2002).
152. Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1175.
153. Id. (indicating that some state expungement statutes might preempt a federal re-
moval statute that expressly invalidated the effect of state statutes. "Assuming that some state
expungement statutes could eliminate completely the immigration consequences of a state
conviction, [California's] is not such a statute."). But see id. at n.6 (citing Murillo-Espinoza,
261 F.3d at 774, as support for the contradictory proposition "that Congress intended to
establish a uniform federal rule that precluded the recognition of subsequent state rehabili-
tative expungements of convictions").
154. As the court properly notes, an expungement "does not affect any revocation or
suspension of [driving privileges]." CAL. VEH. CODE § 13555 (West 2002).
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ability to pay for any damages lingering after a conviction.15 5 Ve-
hicular disabilities also respond to "the desirability of private
automobile insurance as well as state supervision of an activity en-
gaged in by a substantial population." l0 Moreover, unlike removal
from the country, the vehicle code's limitation on the effect of ex-
pungement is not apt to be permanent and is usually discretionary,
depending on the seriousness of the vehicular offense.157 Because
the vehicle code as a whole is geared toward encouraging safety,
suspensions from driving may be lifted after a driver meets certain
rehabilitative terms."Ss Ramirez-Castro fails to demonstrate why tem-
porary, justifiable disabilities under a state vehicle code can
buttress permanent removal under federal immigration law. The
court's logic is very unclear.
In addition, Ramirez-Castro offers no explanation why it paid so
little deference to the authority of the convicting state to cleanse a
convicted person's record for all purposes, if it so chooses. States
are not only burdened with a major portion of the cost of law en-
forcement and prosecution but also the consequences of a non-
citizen's removal from school, place of employment, and family.' '5
Clearly, a state sentencing court is apt to be familiar with each par-
ticular case, individual, and circumstance. 160  States should
therefore be presumed to have authority to determine the effect of
expungement in their own schemes of criminal justice, even when
a federal process-removal of a non-citizen-is at issue.
155. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13361 (West 2002) ("[I]n any case under this section the de-
partment [of motor vehicles) is authorized to require proof of ability to respond in
damages as defined in § 16430.").
156. Pettier & Hilmen, supra note 13, at 128.
157. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13361 (using discretionary language-" [t] he department may
suspend the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle"). See also CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 13556 (outlining that the duration of suspension unless specified otherwise shall not ex-
ceed 12 months and a discretionary suspension "may be ended at the election of the
department"). See Ellis v. D.M.V., 125 P.2d 521, 522 (Cal. App. 1942) (illustrating that a sus-
pension is not permanent and that proof of ability to respond in damages can enable the
reinstatement of a suspended license).
158. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13556.
159. Bleuz6, supra note 96, at 841-47 (finding that the BIA's new rule increases the
costs borne by the states, which must arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate convicted non-
citizens, accommodate non-citizens who may utilize every procedural safeguard to avoid
removal, account for families crippled by the removal of a contributing member, and ac-
count forjobs left open by a removed non-citizen or the family, which might well follow him
or her to the destination of removal).
160. Id. at 846 (arguing that the INA relies on state statutes to define removable crimes
and Congress has increasingly "[delegated] authority to the states in immigration-related
matters, including direct enforcement of immigration law").
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The federal government is unquestionably entrusted with the
authority to deny admission to dangerous or habitual criminal per-
sons and to remove them if necessary. Similarly, citizens have
vested states with powers to impose constraints on ex-convicts even
after they have fulfilled the terms of their sentences. For instance,
many states have enacted Megan's Law statutes,16 1 which record
and furnish information on the residence of convicted and re-
leased sex-offenders. As with a non-citizen facing removal despite
an expunged conviction, a paroled or rehabilitated sex-offender is
still subject to disabilities ranging from abrogation of the of-
fender's privacy to public ostracism, despite the time that he or she
has served. Indeed, Megan's Law statutes encourage a level of pub-
lic ostracism and intrusiveness that expungement statutes sought
to avoid by striking a balance between the public's safety and a
convicted person's right to earn a living and maintain privacy.
62
The consequences of Megan's Law statutes are simply not
comparable to removal of non-citizens. Sex offender statutes,
which are part of the criminal justice system, have limits beyond
which courts will not recognize or apply disabilities.163 Moreover,
the restraints they impose on the liberty of a rehabilitated sex
offender do not normally affect employment or mobility. 64 The
consequences of removal, however, are far more drastic. In
addition, Megan's Law statutes normally apply only to convictions
161. These statutes are a direct consequence of the abduction and murder of Megan
Kanka, a 7-year-old New Jersey native, by Jesse Timmendequas, a 36-year-old who was twice
convicted for child molestation. See William Glaberson, Killer in 'Megan' Case Is Sentenced to
Death, N.Y. TIMES,June 21, 1997, atAl ("Jesse K Timmendequas, whose rape and murder of
a 7-year-old neighbor girl provoked the passage of 'Megan's Laws' to protect children from
sex offenders, was sentenced to death today by a New Jersey jury."). See also WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West 2002), amended by 2003 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 217, H.B. 5410
(West) (authorizing public agencies to release information about sex or kidnapping of-
fenders "when the agency determines that disclosure of the information is relevant and
necessary to protect the public and counteract the danger created by the particular of-
fender"). The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of
Connecticut's and Alaska's "Megan's Law" sex offender registry statutes. Connecticut Dep't
of Pub. Safetyv. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003); Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
162. Franklin &Johnsen, supra note 7, at 736-38; Snow, supra note 90, at 4-20.
163. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. at 1149-52 (subjecting Alaska's "Megan's Law" statute to ex
post facto analysis and making sure that the statute does not impose any lingering physical or
employment restraints before ruling on the statute's constitutionality). See also WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (authorizing the release of a criminal record only if "disclosure of the
information is relevant and necessary to protect the public and counteract the danger cre-
ated by the particular offender").
164. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. at 1151 (observing that "[Alaska's statute] imposes no
physical restraint, and so does not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the
paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint" (citing Hudson v. United States., 522 U.S.
93, 104 (1997)).
The Effect of Expungement
based on serious criminal conduct that would preclude
expungement in any event. Removal, on the other hand, can be
premised on a record of misdemeanor and minor felony
convictions.
Ultimately, Ramirez-Castro seems to interpret California's statu-
tory scheme as weakening rather than bolstering the effect of
expungement. To the contrary, had the Ramirez-Castro court exam-
ined California's Business and Professions Code and that state's
Evidence Code, it would have found that California legislators and
courts have sought to bolster the effect of an expungement.' 65 For
example, courts have upheld provisions in California's Evidence
Code that allow collateral attacks on a witness's credibility predi-
cated upon a felony conviction, but only if the conviction has not
been expunged under § 1203.4.166 Courts have also determined
that the effect of an expungement is abrogated for purposes of
denying or revoking a business license only "where a high degree
of professional skill and fidelity to the public are required on the
part of the licensee."1 7 Nevertheless, "[once an] affirmative show-
ing of rehabilitation [is] made by the applicant ... he may be
restored to his former position as a licensee. ' 68 Moreover, the
Business and Professions Code generally qualifies expungement
only in the instance of felony convictions. 16 9 This limitation, and
the bolstering effect of the two statutes on California's expunge-
ment statute, further weakens any skepticism that the Ramirez-
Castro decision may have had about a distinction, presumably un-
der California law, between misdemeanor and felony convictions.70
165. CAL. EvIo. CODE § 788(c) (West 2002) ("For the purpose of attacking the credibil-
ity of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the
judgment that he has been convicted of a felony unless: ... [tihe accusatory pleading against
the witness has been dismissed under [§]1203.4...." (emphasis added)); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 493 (West 2002) (authorizing the suspension or revocation of business licenses only
if the "licensee has been convicted of a crime substantially related to the qualifications, func-
tions, and duties of the license in question" (emphasis added)).
166. Able Cycle Engines, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 84 A.D.2d 140, 146-47 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981) (resolving the conflict between a New York expungement statute that permits collat-
eral attack of a witness's credibility and California's § 1203.4 that does not).
167. Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 116-17 (1st Dist. 1966).
168. Id.
169. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6102(a) (listing grounds for an attorney's disbarment:
"[u] pon the receipt of the certified copy of the record of conviction, if it appears therefrom
that the crime of which the attorney was convicted ... is a felony under the laws of Califor-
nia, the United States, or any state or territory thereof, the Supreme Court shall suspend the
attorney until the time for appeal has elapsed").
170. Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1175. See supra notes 153 and 157 and accompanying
text.
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V. COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS
Although the United States Supreme Court has stated that Con-
gress's "[immigration] power to admit or exclude aliens is a
sovereign prerogative,"'71 the Court has cautioned that plenary
powers, rooted in the elusive concept of sovereignty, are neverthe-
less "subject to important constitutional limitations [and]
considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the
conduct of all civilized nations.'' 2 The Court's reference to "all civi-
lized nations" to guide interpretations of immigration policy
invites inquiry into the international customary law or general
practice concerning the effect of expungement on removability of
non-citizens.
The immigration laws of other developed nations do not base
deportation solely on the commission of a crime but, instead, take
account of rehabilitative provisions of their positive law, often
premised in international human rights instruments. Canadian
immigration law, for example, bars removal orders predicated
upon a conviction for which a pardon is granted under that coun-
try's Criminal Records Act.173 Although Canadian law does not use
the term "expungement," the Criminal Records Act's pardon pro-
cedure appears to bear on a non-citizen's conviction in the same
way as state expungement statutes in the United States. The Act
includes various qualifications on a pardon that Canadian courts
have refused to extend in immigration proceedings.'
74
171. See Landon %, Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
172. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604
(1889) (emphasis added)). See alsoJames A. R. Nafziger, The GeneralAdmission ofAliens Under
International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L. L. 804, 819 (1983) ("Sovereignty cannot be either the
basis or the source of the law of nations. Rather, the term refers simply to the institutional-
ized independence of states, subject to international law. Beyond that, the concept, as
applied to issues of migration, is undefined and undefinable." (internal quotations omit-
ted)).
173. Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-47, § .5 (2002) (Can.) (stating that a par-
don, which is granted by the parole board, removes any disqualifications arising by reason
of a conviction). See also Smith v. Canada, [1998] 152 F.C. 242 (concluding that Canada's
immigration policy does not allow further disadvantage "that arises from a pardoned con-
viction" despite the court's acknowledgement that the ameliorative provisions of the statute
do not treat the person as if his or her conviction had never existed).
174. Canadian courts have addressed the same issues regarding qualifications of ex-
pungement as in United States jurisprudence. E.g., Smith v. Canada, 152 F.C. at 29-31
(finding that pardons have a few exceptions or qualifications in Canada's criminal code but
none that would support a deportation order). Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1175, by contrast,
found that vehicle code qualifications in California's expungement statute supported the
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The United Kingdom also has a federal comprehensive rehabili-
tative act that provides for expungement of convictions once a
person has met certain conditions. Under the Rehabilitation of
Offenders Act of 1974,17 a conviction is said to be "spent"'17c rather
than "expunged," thereby removing disabilities "for all purposes
on law."'' 77 The U.K. and other European states also protect con-
victed non-citizens under Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), which establishes a "[r]ight to respect for
his private and family life."
178
Nasri v. France,17" a decision by the European Court of Human
Rights, is particularly instructive on the current disparities between
U.S. and European immigration law.'80 In Nasri, the French Minis-
try of the Interior had attempted to deport a deaf and mute
Algerian national on the basis of convictions for theft, theft with
violence, assaulting a public official, receipt of stolen goods, and
gang rape.'8 ' The Court ruled, however, that a deportation to Alge-
ria would violate Article 8 of the ECHR and otherwise would not
BIA's reasonable conclusion "that a conviction expunged under [§ 1203.4] remains a con-
viction for purposes of federal law."
175. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, c.53 (Eng.).
176. See Police Act, 1997, c.50, part V § 112(3) (b) (Eng.).
177. Dillingham, 267 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (summarizing the British expunge-
ment statute).
178. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating that "[e] veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interfer-
ence by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, orfor the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" (emphasis added)).
179. Nasri v. France, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 458 (1995).
180. See also Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 419, 430-33 (2000) (recognizing the
need for "a fair balance" between the goals served by a removal order and "the seriousness
of the interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private and family life"); id. at
434 (finding that the seriousness of an offense, any indication of recidivism, and severity of
sentences against the alien "are crucial factors in assessing the proportionality of the re-
moval order to the aim pursued"). See also Djeroud v France, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 68, 78 (1992)
("[I]n the opinion [of the former European Commission of Human Rights] a State must
take into account the consequences which may flow from the removal of an alien from his
place of residence. This is all the more necessary when the person concerned does not
speak the language of his country of origin and has no family or other social links with that
country."); Regina v. Sterling, [20021 Crim. App. R. 1181, 2002 WL 1039575 (C.A. Eng.)
(finding that Article 8 corresponds to existing British immigration laws, which require
courts to execute removal orders only after "full inquiry into all the circumstances [and the
effect] upon others who are not before the court and who are innocent persons. This court
and all other courts would have no wish to break up families or impose hardship on inno-
cent people.").
181. Nasri, (1996) 21 Euro. Ct. H.R., at 460-61.
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be proportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining public or-
der.
18 2
After considering the applicant's schooling, the Court concluded
that he had no skills of literacy or signing."' The court also
compared psychiatric reports that described Mr. Nasri as non-
dangerous with police reports that claimed "he inspires terror in
many inhabitants of [the city] ... and takes advantage of his
handicap and of the favorable provisions of the administrative and
justice systems. He is a real danger to public order."8 4 Conceding
that it is left to the member states "to maintain public order"
consistent with their immigration policies, the Court nevertheless
found that deportation must be necessary or 'justified by a pressing
social need.'',1 In the applicant's case, the court emphasized that the
most serious crime, gang rape, had been committed ten years earlier
and that the applicant had little or no family or other social links in
Algeria. 18 6 The court concluded that "only in exceptional
circumstances may the deportation of an alien in cases where he
has no family or other social links with the country to which he is
sent be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued by the
government.
187
This brief look at the ECHR's governance of deportation issues
in Europe suggests the possibility of a broader framework under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)."88 Although the ICCPR does not address specific issues of
deportation[,] or relief from it, the instrument does provide
minimum standards to protect deportable non-citizens. For exam-
ple, non-citizens facing deportation are entitled to argue against
their expulsion, and states are barred from arbitrary interference
with a non-citizen's family or home. The ICCPR also ensures the
protection of the family, as the fundamental unit of society."89 The
182. Id. at 458.
183. Id. at 466.
184. Id. at 462-65.
185. Id. at 470.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See also Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act,
26 FORDHAM INr'L L.J. 1345, 1373 n.95 (2003) (illustrating that the ECHR conforms to the
ICCPR); Accord, Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The ECHR and States of Emergency: Article 15-A Do-
mestic Power of Derogation From Human Rights Obligations, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 277, 279
(2003).
189. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 13, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force 1976). The United States ratified the ICCPR on June
8, 1992. Article 13 of the ICCPR states that "an alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party
to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision
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latter provision in particular argues against removal of a family
member based solely on a conviction when that conviction has
been expunged. '90
These comparative insights call into question Matter of Roldan's
refusal to offset the effect of an expunged criminal record with an
equitable consideration of a non-citizen's tenure as a U.S. resident,
his or her familial ties in the U.S., or any cultural or linguistic dif-
ficulties associated with a removal order. Centuries ago, before the
evolution of modern civil liberty protections, Lord Coke com-
mented, "peona mori potest, culpa perennis erit" ""-although
punishment can terminate, guilt endures forever. The BIA's new
rule goes much further by practically ensuring that not only guilt
but punishment will endure forever.
CONCLUSION
The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (IIRIRA) defined the term "conviction" as a basis for
removal of a non-citizen. The salient purpose of the new definition
was to substitute a uniform federal standard for a myriad of state
definitions. Congress did not, however, address the issue of what
effect should be given to an expungement or amelioration of a
conviction under either state or federal law. Then, three years later
in Matter of Roldan, the Board of Immigration Appeals surprisingly
construed the IIRIRA to render expungement irrelevant, reversing
reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national
security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to
have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent au-
thority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority." Id. at art.
13. Under article 17, "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence." Id. at art. 17. The ICCPR also states that "the
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State." Id. at art. 23.
190. See Nancy Morawitz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1950-52 (2000) (illustrating the dire impli-
cations of immigration laws that require mandatory deportation: "[families] may have built
a business in the United States or may be unable to begin a new career in a new country,"
once the breadwinner or patriarch is deported. "Even if they are able to leave and immi-
grate to the native country of the deported family member, they would in effect experience
deportation as well-they would be removed from the country that they consider their
home and sent to another country to which they may have only attenuated connections or
no connections at all.").
191. Portnoy, supra note 12, at 306 (quoting Brown v. Crashaw, 80 Eng. Rep. 1028 (KB.
1614)).
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a half-century of precedent. Several judicial decisions have since
ratified this aberrant decision, primarily on the basis of the Chevron
doctrine, instructing courts to defer substantially to an administra-
tive agency's interpretation of a statute such as the IIRIRA.
A blanket refusal in removal proceedings to give effect to an ex-
pungement of a non-citizen's conviction, unless a federal statute
specifically provides for it, is unsound. The ruling in Matter of
Roldan, which has now been unfortunately (and erroneously) shel-
tered from judicial scrutiny by the Chevron doctrine, should be
abandoned. But that may be easier said than done. Although the
drafting of federal expungement legislation to overturn Matter of
Roldan might appear simple, it "is a labyrinth of complex legal is-
sues and difficult value judgments."192 Alternatively, Congress could
provide for grants of discretionary waivers of removal to any non-
citizen whose offense has been expunged under either state or
federal law. 93 In doing so, Congress would be following its course
in the Firearm Owners' Protection Act.
94
In the absence of new legislation to overturn Matter of Roldan,
the BIA and the federal courts should take it upon themselves to
restore the long-standing rule that a state's expungement of its
own criminal conviction should, with limited exceptions,' 95 provide
relief from removal. No compelling statutory or policy basis sup-
ports the aberrant rule in Matter of Roldan. Nor is an uncritical
judicial deference to the BIA decision, as in the Murrillo-Espinoza
and Ramirez-Castro decisions, persuasive. Even if reasonable minds
may differ on the wisdom of the new anti-expungement rule, the
Chevron doctrine does not require judicial acceptance of it. Federal
agencies and courts should be careful to protect the civil liberties
of non-citizens, even in the face of terrorism and abuse of the pre-
cious privilege of immigration itself.
192. Diehm, supra note 21, at 101.
193. See Restoration of Fairness in Immigration Act, H.R. 3894, 107th Cong. § 201 (d) (i)
(2002) (giving the United States Attorney General discretion to waive any conviction that
has not resulted in incarceration for more than one year).
194. See id. at § 201 (e) (1) (recommending that the IIRIRA's definition of a conviction
expressly exclude one that has been "expunged, deferred, annulled, invalidated, [or] with-
held").
195. Such exceptions can include limitations on the number of times expungement
may be utilized and the magnitude of eligible offenses.
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